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RECENT DECISIONS
clarified its standards of constitutionality by manifesting their limita-
tions, and held that these standards as propounded in the states of
origin apply with equal force and effect in the states of market.
EDWARD A. DUDEK
Extradition-Extraditable Offense Under the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act-Petitioner Bledsoe, a resident of Oklahoma, was
arrested in that state on a warrant honoring a demand for extradition
made by the Governor of Kansas. The demand alleged that Petitioner
was charged in Kansas with the statutory offense of failure to provide
for the support and maintenance of his minor children, who were re-
siding in Kansas. Petitioner brought this action in habeas corpus,
alleging that (1) the Uniform Criminal Extradition Acte under which
his extradition is sought is unconstitutional because in conflict with
federal constitutional and statutory provisions relating to extradition;
and (2) Petitioner has never been in the State of Kansas and has
no agents in that State; he would not therefore be guilty of any crime
committed in Kansas. Held: Writ denied. The Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act is not repugnant to the Federal Constitution, and the ac-
tual presence of Petitioner within the demanding state at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense is not a prerequisite for his conviction
therefor. Ex parte Bledsoe, 227 P. 2d 680 (Okla., 1951).
The constitutionality of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
which has been adopted in nearly every state of the Union, is now
uniformly established and no longer open to serious questioning.
2
The same conclusion seems to be true in Wisconsin, which adopted the
Act in 1933
The provision of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act applicable
in the principal case reads as follows:
"Surrender of persons not fleeing from demanding State. The
Governor of this State may also surrender, on demand of the
Executive Authority of any other state, any person in this State
122 OKLA. STAT. 1949 Supp. Sec. 1141.1.
2 Ex parte Morgan, 194 P.2d 800 (Cal. App. 1948) ; Cassis v. Fair, 126 W.Va.
557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944) ; Ennist v. Baden, 158 Fla. 141, 28 So.2d 160 (1946) ;
English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E.2d 898 (1947) ; Ex parte Camp-
bell, 147 Neb. 820, 25 N.W.2d 819 (1946); Osborn v. Harris, 203 P.2d 912
(Utah, 1949) ; In re Harris, 309 Mass. 180, 34 N.E2d 504 (1941). See also 22
Am. Jun., ExTRADmrnol, §9 and cases there cited. The Supreme Court of the
United States has never passed on the constitutionally of Sec. 6 specifically.
3 Wis. STATS. (1933) Chap. 364. The constitutionality of this Chapter has never
been squarely passed upon in Wisconsin. In Milwaukee County v. Van Den
Berg, 215 Wis. 519, 255 N.W. 65 (1934); State ex rel. Wells v. Hanley, 250
Wis. 374, 27 N.W.2d 373 (1947); and State ex rel. Kohl v. Kubiak, 255 Wis.
186, 38 N.%V2d 499 (1949), where individual sections of this chapter were con-
strued, the court appears to assume that the act is constitutional. A similar
assumption seems to be made by the Attorney General of Wisconsin in 21
O.A.G. 991,22 O.A.G. 755, and 23 O.A.G. 757.
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charged in sqch other state * * * with committing any Act in
this State * * * intentionally resulting in a crime in the state
whose Executive Authority is making the demand, * * * even
though the accused was not in that state at the time of the
commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom." 4
This provision clearly indicates that the Uniform Criminal Extra-
dition Act intended to extend extradition to persons who are not,
strictly speaking, "fugitives from Justice," not having fled from the
jurisdiction of the demanding state. This extension is not envisaged
by the Constitution of the United States.5 Conceding that this would
not in and of itself render that provision unconstitutional,6 it still
seems to present the abstract question of whether a person who has
never been within the territorial boundaries of the demanding state,
can be guilty of a criminal offense in that state.
Most courts find no difficulty in answering the question in the
affirmative, provided it can be shown that the accused, although never
physically present in the demanding state, accomplished a criminal
result therein through an agent or accessory. 7 Through such agent or
accessory the accused is held to have been constructively present in the
demanding state, thereby subjecting himself to its criminal jurisdic-
tion. This "constructive presence" theory has been used by the courts
in a great number of instances, particularly in conspiracy cases where
the conspiracy itself and the overt act occurred in two different juris-
dictions, and defendant never entered the latter jurisdiction."
A much more difficult problem is presented in cases where the ac-
cused was neither actually nor constructively present in the demand-
ing state at the time of the alleged offense. A few older cases squarely
hold that prosecution cannot be had in such cases.9 In extradition
cases prior to the enactment of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act (and particularly Sec. 6 thereof) the courts have arrived at sub-
4 UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION Acr, Sec. 6; 220 S. 1949 Supp. Sec. 1141.6;
WIs. STATS. (1949) 364.06.
•"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." U. S. CONSTITUTION,
Art 4, sec. 2, cl. 2.
GEx parte Morgan, supra, note 2; Cassis v. Fair, supra, note 2; English v. Mato-
wi:z, supra, note 2; Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal.2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942) ; Innes
v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 36 S.Ct. 290 (1915), holding that the States could validly
extradite persons not "fugitives from Justice" as a matter of comity.
14 Am. JuR., CRIMINAL LAW, §§227, 228, 229, and cases there cited; principal
case, cited in text, relying on Cassis v. Fair, supra, note 2.
a Rex v. Brisac, 3 East. 164 (1803) ; Reg. v. Jones, 1 Dem. C.C. 551, 4 Cox C.C.
193 (1791) ; Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 108 (1886) ; Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41,
17 S.E. 984 (1893); Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408 (1862);
Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1853) ; State v. Morrow, 130 N.C. 811, 40 S.E.
853 (1883).




stantially the same result by holding that persons not actually or con-
structively present in the demanding state at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense charged were not "fugitives from justice"
(as indeed they could not have been) and therefore not extraditable. 0
The courts have thus avoided having to decide the question by rigid
adherance to the "fugitive from justice" test.
As during the course of the 'thirties most states adopted the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the problem received some clari-
fication. While Sec. 6 does not purport to answer the theoretical ques-
tion of the possibility of committing a crime while not actually or
constructively present at the locus thereof, it practically decided it, at
least so far as extradition was concerned, by unequivocally authoriz-
ing extradition in such cases, provided the act complained of was
alleged to have occurred in the asylum state.
Judicial interpretation of Sec. 6 has been less unanimous than might
have been expected."' In Culbertson v. Sweeney,'12 the Ohio court
construed Sec. 6 to authorize extradition only where the accused had
been at least constructively present in the demanding state. On the
basis of the language of Sec. 6 this construction seems quite unjustifi-
able. As has already been stated above, Sec. 6 very clearly authorizes
extradition regardless of the actual or constructive presence of the
accused in the demanding state. The only logical reason behind tle
Ohio court's decision could be that in the opinion of that court no
crime can be committed without actual or constructive presence in the
demanding jurisdiction. While this court does not squarely decide
the question, one cannot help being impressed by the apparent con-
clusion that, in Ohio at least, our theoretical question would be answered
in the negative.
The New York courts, which first squarely faced the problem in
People ex rel. Buck v. Britt et al.,"3 wavered at first in favor of the
Ohio view as expressed in the Culbertson case, by holding that a New
York resident, who returned to his home therein after his discharge
from the Army and was never in Minnesota, to which his wife, whom
he had married in California during his army service, moved after he
was sent overseas, could not be extradited to Minnesota for abandon-
ment. The precise question facing the court in this case was some-
what different from that in the Culbertson case, because the New
York version of Sec. 614 adds the additional requirement that the act
10 In re Kuhns, 36 Nev. 487, 137 P.83 (1913) ; State v. Toney, 162 N.C. 635, 78
S.E. 156 (1913); 16 C.J. CRIMMINAL LAW §164 and cases there cited.
11 People ex rel. Buck v. Britt, et al., 62 N.Y.S2d 479 (1946).
1270 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E.2d 807 (1942). See also In re Roma, 82 Ohio App.
414, 81 N.E.2d 612 (1950).
is Suprd, note 11.
14 CoD. CR. PRoc., §834.
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for which extradition is sought be punishable in New York also. The
reasoning of the court, however, is somewhat analogous to the Ohio
view, as it is largely based upon the theory that the accused had
never subjected himself to the criminal jurisdiction of Minnesota, and
therefore could not be extradited.15 ,
The following year the New York court was again confronted with
the question in the case of People ex rel. Fazio v. Warden of City
Penitentiary of New York County et al.'8 The facts here were similar
to those in the Buck case. The court refused extradition because the
Minnesota demand claimed extradition on the theory that the accused
was a "fugitive from justice," which he obviously was not. The court
then goes on to say that had the demand been made on the basis of
Sec. 6, petitioner could have been extradited. No reasons are given
behind this dictum, but it clearly indicates that the New York court
is breaking away from the result of the Ohio view as expressed in
the Culbertson and Buck cases.
In 1950, when an identical fact situation faced the New York court
in People ex rel. Kaufman v. O'Brien,7 the final break with the Ohio
view occurred as the court clearly held that under Sec. 6 neither the
actual nor the constructive presence of the accused in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the alleged offense need be
shown. The reasoning behind this decision logically is that it is possi-
ble to commit a crime without actual or constructive presence in the
demanding jurisdiction. Thus the New York view, diametrically op-
posite to the Ohio view, would answer our theoretical question in the
affirmative.
An examination of the decisions in other jurisdictions shows that
the New York view is now the view of the decided weight of authority.
Oklahoma, as indicated by the principal case, clearly follows the New
York view. The same is true of the California court, which, in the
recent case of Ex parte Hayes,'8 held that any act which in the de-
manding state results in crime is punishable there, regardless of the
actual or constructive presence of the accused therein.
While no Wisconsin decisions are found in point, it would appear
that a Wisconsin court faced with the question would follow the New
York view and thus answer our problem in the affirmative. An opinion
of the Attorney General of Wisconsin appears to support this con-
clusion. 9  GEORGE G. LORINCZI
25 62 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (1946).
16 69 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1947).
1796 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1950).
's 225 P.2d 272 (Cal. App., 1950).
1923 O.A.G. 757. A recent amendment of Wis. STATs. Sec. 49.135, the UNIFORM
REcIPROCAL ENFORcEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT. (Chapter 23, Laws of 1951) some-
what simplified extradition for nonsupport under certain conditions. See supra,
p. 126, this issue.
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